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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI, : Case No. 960665-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8 (a) (2) (i) , in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
I. Whether the stop of Appellant's car was illegal from its 
inception due to a lack of reasonable suspicion in violation of 
Appellant's constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
Standard of Review. "[T]he proper standard of review to be 
applied to a trial court determination of whether a specific set 
of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a determination of 
law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness. . . [T] he 
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one that conveys a measure 
of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts. . . .On the other hand, a sufficiently 
careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served." State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); see also State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 973 (Utah App. 1988) ("Because a determination of the 
constitutionality of a police officer's stop of a person under 
the fourth amendment turns upon the facts of each case, we review 
the facts in detail")(citation omitted). 
II. Whether the court below erred in admitting at the 
preliminary hearing a toxicology report prepared by the state 
crime lab where such report does not fit within any recognized 
hearsay exception, and is otherwise lacking foundation, in 
violation of Appellant's constitutional right of confrontation 
and his statutory right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at a 
preliminary proceeding as secured by the rules of evidence and 
criminal procedure. 
Standard of Review: "Whether a piece of evidence is 
admissible is a question of law, and we always review questions 
of law under a correctness standard." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 789 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Motion to Quash Bindover based on lack of 
reasonable suspicion and inadmissible hearsay evidence, and 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress based on lack of reasonable 
suspicion, are preserved in the Record on Appeal ("R.") at 24-45, 
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75-76. Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to 
Rule 11 (i), Utah R. Crim. P., and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 
(Utah App. 1988), which are preserved at R.93-94. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions 
will be determinative of the issue on appeal: 
Amendment IV, United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . 
Article I, Section 14, Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; . . . . 
Article I, Section 13, Utah Constitution: 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent 
of the State . . . . 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him . . . Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to 
a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists . . . Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause . 
Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in 
any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if 
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
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activity, and if it was the regular practice of the 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, 
unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
Rule 803(8)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in 
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth 
. . . (B) matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed 
by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed 
by police officers and other law enforcement personnel 
Rule 1101(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence: 
The rules [of evidence] . . . do not apply in the 
following situations: . . . (5) in a preliminary 
examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed 
to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay evidence. 
Rule 7(h)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules 
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a 
court. The state has the burden of proof and shall 
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
state's case, the defendant . . . may [] cross-examine 
adverse witnesses. 
Rule 7(h)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
If from the evidences a magistrate finds probable cause 
to believe that the crime charged has been committed 
and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate 
shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound 
over to answer in the district court. The findings of 
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in 
p a r t . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
On May 20, 1996, the State of Utah charged Appellant Nelson 
Rodriguez-Lopi ("Rodriguez") with one count of unlawful 
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possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1996), one count of 
carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. 76-10-505 (1995), and one count of 
transporting an open container, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.20 (1993), and served him 
with an arrest warrant. R. 5-6, 8-10. 
At the preliminary hearing, the State submitted the 
testimony of police officers and a toxicology report prepared by 
the Utah Crime Lab alleging that the substance found on 
Rodriguez's person was cocaine. R.47-78. Rodriguez challenged 
the admission of the toxicology report as inadmissible hearsay 
lacking foundation. R.50-52, 68-71. The magistrate held the 
report admissible and bound the case over to the Third Judicial 
District Court based on the findings contained in the report plus 
the testimony of the arresting officers. R.72. 
In a Motions Proceeding in the Third Judicial District Court 
before Judge J. Dennis Frederick, Rodriguez again challenged the 
admission of the toxicology report by filing a Motion to Quash 
Bindover. R.24-45. In the Motion, Rodriguez asserted that the 
State could not establish the corpus delicti given that the 
toxicology report, the only competent evidence establishing the 
corpus delicti of the crime, was inadmissible hearsay under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8) (B). R.30-36. Rodriguez also 
challenged the report for lack of foundation, R. 39-45, and as a 
violation of his rights of confrontation and cross-examination. 
5 
R. 36-39. 
Rodriguez further challenged the stop of his vehicle in a 
Motion to Suppress Evidence on the grounds that the officers 
lacked reasonable suspicion. R.75-76. In a Motion to Suppress 
Defendant's Statements, Rodriguez challenged the admission of an 
incriminating statement made while under arrest in violation of 
his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). R.22. Rodriguez also filed a Motion to 
Suppress Evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search of his car 
and his person. R.77-78. The trial court granted his motion to 
suppress his statement, but denied all other motions. R.125. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into a plea agreement 
wherein Rodriguez pled guilty to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance. R.93-94. The parties specifically 
conditioned the plea upon Rodriguez's right to appeal the 
dismissed motion to quash the bindover based on the admission of 
the toxicology report, the stop of his vehicle, and the admission 
of evidence seized thereafter, pursuant to Rule 11 (i) , Utah R. 
Crim. P., and State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
R.93-94. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of May 19, 1996, at approximately five a.m., 
Appellant Nelson Rodriguez-Lopi ("Rodriguez") was driving his 
truck between fifteenth and sixteenth south in the northbound, 
outside lane of State Street in Salt Lake City. R. 159. A friend 
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of Rodriguez was riding in the passenger seat. Id. 
Two police officers, Officer Farris ("Farris") and Officer 
Schow ("Schow"), were driving a marked police car in the same 
direction and the same lane several car lengths behind Rodriguez. 
Both officers observed Rodriguez driving unusually close to the 
gutter at approximately ten miles per hour while passing two 
women walking on the sidewalk. R. 161, 176. The truck did not 
stop moving at any point, and remained on the paved road at all 
times. R. 166, 168, 183. There were no signs indicating the 
legal speed limit in that area, nor parking meters or markings 
indicating that the part of the road upon which Rodriguez drove 
was reserved exclusively for parking. R. 166, 167. 
The officers also observed the passenger stick his head out 
the window as the truck passed the women, but did not hear the 
conversation among them. R. 161, 182. Officer Farris had second-
hand knowledge that the women were prostitutes, but did not have 
personal knowledge of such information. R. 168. Officer Schow 
was not acquainted with the women at all. R. 176. 
Based on the fact that Rodriguez was driving close to the 
curb at a slow speed, and the fact that the passenger was leaning 
out the window to speak to two women whom Farris had heard were 
prostitutes, the officers decided to pull Rodriguez over. R. 
160, 161. The record does not indicate any specific statutory 
violation upon which the officers justified their stop of 
Rodriguez's vehicle. 
Rodriguez continued to drive for more than a city block 
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before stopping, (R. 161, 176), during which time the officers 
observed both men reaching under the seat. Id. Once the car 
stopped, Schow approached the driver side window and Farris 
approached the passenger window. R. 161. Based on a suspicion 
that the men were concealing contraband when observed reaching 
under the seat, Schow ordered both men out of the car and 
instructed them to stand at the rear of the truck. R. 177, 185. 
Farris looked into the truck and initially viewed an open 
bottle of beer in the middle of the floorboard, and then, as he 
moved to the front of the truck, he spied a pistol lying on the 
floor underneath the driver's seat. R. 162. Farris yelled "gun" 
to notify Schow and Officers Findlay ("Findlay") and Housley, who 
had arrived on the scene as backup in the interim. R. 162, 185. 
Farris approached Rodriguez and told him to turn around and 
put his hands up. R. 163, 185. Rodriguez hesitated so Farris 
took him to the ground and handcuffed him. R. 163, 186. At that 
point, Findlay, who was standing next to Farris and Rodriguez, 
noticed a baggie containing a white powdery substance partially 
sticking out of Rodriguez's shirt pocket. R. 186. Findlay 
picked it up and inquired, "what is this?". R. 187. There is a 
discrepancy among the officers' testimony as to Rodriguez's exact 
response, varying from "coca" to "cocaina" and "cocanini". 
Nonetheless, all officers understood Rodriguez to mean cocaine. 
R. 179, 187. 
The officers stipulate that Rodriguez was under full arrest 
at the moment he was placed in handcuffs. R. 171, 188. However, 
8 
Findlay did not Mirandize Rodriguez prior to questioning him 
about the contents of the baggie. R. 189. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The stop of Rodriguez's automobile was not premised upon 
reasonable suspicion and, therefore, the evidence seized as a 
result of the illegal stop is inadmissible. The arresting 
officers did not state a specific traffic violation which led 
them to stop Rodriguez. Moreover, the reasons offered by the 
arresting officers, namely that Rodriguez was driving close to 
the curb at a slow speed while passing two women, do not give 
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot such that the stop was appropriate in this 
case. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying Rodriguez's 
Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to the illegal stop. 
In addition to the erroneous admission of illegally seized 
evidence, the district court erred in admitting a toxicology 
report offered by the State Crime Lab at Rodriguez's preliminary 
hearing since the report constituted unreliable hearsay under the 
rules of evidence. Specifically, the State did not present any 
evidence establishing its foundation, and case law otherwise 
prohibits the use of scientific police reports under the business 
records exception to the rules of evidence and excludes it as a 
police report under the public records exception. The admission 
of the toxicology report violated Rodriguez's constitutional 
right of confrontation and his statutory right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses at the preliminary proceeding. Consequently, 
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the district court committed reversible constitutional and 
prejudicial error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Stop of Rodriguez's Car Was Not Premised Upon a 
Reasonable Suspicion From Its Inception And Thus All 
Evidence Seized As A Result Of the Illegal Stop Is 
Inadmissible. 
The stop of Rodriguez's car was illegal from its inception 
since the circumstances surrounding the stop did not give rise to 
a reasonable suspicion such that an investigative stop was 
constitutional. See Amend. IV, United States Const.; Article I, 
§ 14, Utah Const. Subsequently, the seizure of evidence as a 
result of the initial encounter is inadmissible under the fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine, and the conviction should be 
reversed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 
83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.ed.2d 441 (1963). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 
(Utah 1991), stated that n/stopping an automobile and detaining 
its occupants constitute[s] a seizure' within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1131 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse
 f 440 
U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). A traffic 
stop, therefore, must satisfy the two requirements governing 
investigative stops set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 
S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1669 (I960), namely that the stop is 
justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion at its inception 
and that it is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
justifying the stop in the first place." Lopez at 1132 (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20); see also 77-7-15 (1996)(codifying the 
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constitutionally mandated standard for investigative stops). If 
an investigative stop does not meet these requirements, then all 
evidence seized pursuant thereto is inadmissible as a fruit of 
the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. 
As to reasonable suspicion, the critical inquiry in this 
case, the Lopez Court delineated two possible situations where a 
stop would be justified. First, "a police officer is 
constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
'incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' 
presence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 
(Utah App. 1990)). Second, a stop may be justified in the 
absence of an observed violation where the officer has "a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a 
traffic offense, such as driving under the influence of alcohol, 
. . . [or a] more serious criminal activity." Id. This 
determination may be considered in light of the totality of the 
circumstances, (see State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 
1988)) and the officers' experience. See State v. Holmes, 774 
P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989). 
The stop at issue in this case does not fall within either 
of the categories where reasonable suspicion exists to stop a 
vehicle. First, the State does not establish in the record what, 
if any, violation occurred to justify the stop. Nor does the 
officers' testimony indicate this information. Farris alludes to 
a possible drunk driving or solicitation violation based on the 
slow rate of speed, closeness to the curb, and the fact that the 
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passenger leaned out the window as the truck rolled by two women 
whom he knew second hand to be prostitutes. However, none of 
these actions constitute infractions of the law1 and, hence, do 
not justify the stop based on an observed violation under Lopez. 
873 P.2d at 1132. 
Second, the circumstances surrounding the stop do not give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation or 
criminal activity was afoot. Rather, the speculative reasons 
proffered by Farris in justification of his stop of Rodriguez 
were mere hunches that do not pass constitutional muster. See 
State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1994)("'anything 
less [than reasonable, articulable suspicion] would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this 
Court has consistently refused to sanction'")(quoting State v. 
Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987); citing Terry, 392 
1
 The most plausible traffic violation that Rodriguez could 
be cited for is for failing to drive "as nearly as practical 
entirely within a single lane." Utah Code Ann. 41-6-61(1) (1996) . 
However, Rodriguez was driving on the paved portion of the road at 
all times, and the area did not bear any markings indicating the 
dividing line between the driving lane and the "parking area" 
referred to by Farris in his testimony such that Rodriguez would 
have been on notice of the violation, if any. 
The crime of solicitation could not be charged against the 
passenger in Rodriguez's car since that offense is not complete 
until a bargain has been made to engage in a sexual activity. See 
Utah Code Ann. 76-10-1302 (1996) . Given that neither officer knew 
first hand that the women were prostitutes, that the vehicle never 
came to a full stop, that only seconds passed as the officers 
observed the passenger stick his head out the window as the truck 
rolled by the women, and that the officers did not hear any of the 
conversation between the passenger and the women, the officers 
could not cite Rodriguez or the passenger for solicitation. 
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U.S. at 21-22) . 
Moreover, each of the reasons Farris cites in support of the 
stop have been rejected by Utah Courts as bases of reasonable 
suspicion. Specifically, Farris cites Rodriguez's slowness, 
position in the lane, and the passenger's leaning out of the 
window as the truck passed by the two women as reasons for 
effectuating the stop. 
As to Rodriguez's slow driving, Utah Courts have held in 
factually similar cases that slow driving does not amount to 
reasonable suspicion. See Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 
(Utah App. 1989); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986). 
For example, the Utah Supreme Court in Carpena held that an 
officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to pull 
over a motorist with out-of-state plates who was driving slowly 
through a residential area at 3:00 a.m. Id. at 674. Likewise, 
in Thorsness, this Court held that an officer lacked reasonable 
suspicion of drunk driving to stop a defendant who stopped to 
look at an officer helping a stranded motorist by the side of the 
road at 1:30 a.m., then begrudgingly moved on at half the posted 
speed at the officer's request. This Court noted that absent 
"reckless, erratic driving patterns [] indicat[ing] a lack of 
vehicle control, . . . [such] facts are equally indicative of 
innocent behavior and, without more, do not provide a reasonable 
basis to suspect defendant of being intoxicated." Thorsness, 778 
P.2d at 1101. Given that Farris expressly premised the stop on 
the fact that he "suspected that the drive[r] [sic] may be 
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drunk," (R.161), the trial court below erred in finding that 
Farris and Schow had reasonable suspicion in light of Utah case 
law which rejects slow driving as an indication of drunk driving. 
As in Thorsness, the facts of the present case do not evince a 
"lack of vehicle control" which would justify the stop. 
Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1101. 
Even when considered in connection with Rodriguez's 
closeness to the curb, the officer could not reasonably infer 
that Rodriguez was not in control of the car. Rodriguez was not 
weaving, he maintained a constant speed and course, he remained 
on the paved road, and he was not blocking traffic nor 
endangering pedestrians. The mere fact of driving slow to the 
right of the lane does not adequately establish the 
constitutionally mandated level of reasonable suspicion. 
As to Farris hunch of solicitation, the circumstances 
surrounding these events likewise do not establish reasonable 
suspicion in justification of the stop. Instructive on this 
issue is this Court's opinion in State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506 
(Utah App. 1989), and the opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in U.S. v. Bvrd, 47 F.3d 1170 (C.A.6 1995). In both 
cases, the respective fact patterns, as compared with the 
distinctive facts of the instant case, highlight when reasonable 
suspicion of solicitation legitimately arises. 
In Holmes, this Court found reasonable suspicion of 
solicitation to exist where officers with a combined total of 
thirty-four years of vice experience initially observed a woman 
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standing on the sidewalk talking to a man in a car, then watched 
her as she began to stroll up the street, turning back 
occasionally to check the traffic, and ultimately saw her have 
brief conversations with male drivers of two other vehicles, and 
get into the second car. Consequently, the officers were 
justified in conducting an investigative stop of the car that the 
woman entered. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 507. In Byrd, the United 
States Court of Appeals found that reasonable suspicion existed 
only where an officer noticed defendant's car parked in the 
middle of the road, and observed a known prostitute whom the 
officer had earlier told to get off the street leaning into the 
passenger side talking to the driver. Byrd, 47 F.3d at 1170. 
The present case is distinguishable from Holmes and Byrd in 
many significant respects. First, Rodriguez never stopped as the 
truck passed the women, unlike the vehicles in the other cases. 
R.183. In fact, the truck rapidly overtook the women who were 
walking in the same direction but at a much slower pace. Id. 
Second, Farris and Schow merely observed the passenger stick 
his head out of the car as it passed the women, but were too far 
off to hear what, if any, conversation ensued. R. 169, 182. 
Contrary to the other cases where the prostitutes actually 
approached a stopped vehicle and spoke to the occupants, the 
record here does not establish that anything more than a brief 
exchange transpired between the passenger and the women. 
Third, neither Farris nor Schow knew based on their own 
knowledge that either of the women were prostitutes. R. 168, 
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176. Moreover, they did not articulate in their testimony that 
the women were acting in any peculiar way, such as strolling 
rather than walking at a normal pace or looking back at traffic 
as if to seek out possible customers, which would lead them to 
suspect that the crime of solicitation was in progress. 
In light of Byrd and Holmes, the comparatively innocuous 
events leading up to the stop of Rodriguez's car based on a 
brief, passing encounter with two women, whose purpose was never 
discerned, does not rise to the level of a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion of solicitation such that a stop would be 
appropriate in this case. And even if the women were known 
prostitutes, the mere act of slowing down to "check out" two 
women, as young men are want to do, is not so unusual as to 
warrant a stop of the car. 
In sum, Farris and Schow did not offer a sufficient, 
objective basis for the stop of Rodriguez. Initially, they did 
not establish why his slow driving to the right of the lane was 
peculiar to the point that it raised a reasonable suspicion of 
loss of control of the vehicle due to intoxication or a medical 
condition. In addition, they did not articulate any objective 
facts, other than second-hand knowledge, why they believed the 
women walking on the sidewalk were involved in prostitution or 
why the sole act of sticking one's head out the window as the 
truck drove by the women was sufficiently suspicious to warrant 
further investigation. Utah and federal case law does not 
support such attenuations between circumstance and suspicion, but 
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rather requires a more objective basis before an individual's 
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure 
may be suspended. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding 
that reasonable suspicion existed to support the initial stop of 
Rodriguez's automobile. Consequently, the trial court erred in 
denying Rodriguez's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant 
to an illegal stop as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
II. The Admission of the Toxicology Report Violated 
Appellant's Constitutional Right of Confrontation and 
His Right to Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses Secured 
Under The Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure, 
Constituting Reversible Error. 
The magistrate erred in binding Rodriguez over to the trial 
court based on information contained within the toxicology report 
since the toxicology report constituted hearsay not within any 
exception to the rules of evidence and lacked foundation which 
might otherwise establish its trustworthiness. The admission of 
the report not only violated Rodriguez's statutory right to 
cross-examine adverse witnesses as secured by the rules of 
evidence and criminal procedure, but also violated his 
constitutional right of confrontation. Consequently, the 
magistrate committed reversible constitutional error and 
reversible prejudicial error since the outcome of the preliminary 
hearing would have been different had the report been properly 
excluded. 
A. The Rules of Evidence are Applicable to 
Preliminary Hearings and are Thus Determinative of 
Admissible "Reliable Hearsay". 
Under the Utah Constitution, the Utah Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure, and case law, the Utah Rules of Evidence are 
applicable to preliminary hearings and are thus determinative of 
what is admissible, reliable hearsay. 
The Utah Constitution provides for the use of reliable 
hearsay at preliminary hearings, but defines "reliable hearsay" 
under the terms of the evidentiary rules. See Art. I, § 12, Utah 
Const.; see also State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 
1980)(rules of evidence regarding hearsay evidence are procedural 
protections of a criminal defendant's rights under Confrontation 
Clause). Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution permits 
"reliable hearsay" to be admitted in a preliminary hearing in 
support of probable cause to bind a criminal defendant over to 
the district court. However, Article I, Section 12 also 
expressly provides that reliable hearsay is admissible "as 
defined by rule or statute." Art. I, § 12, Utah Const, (emphasis 
added). The plain language of Article I, Section 12, therefore, 
directs that the rules governing the use of hearsay are 
instructive in determining "reliability" for purposes of its use 
at a preliminary hearing. 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure likewise establish that 
the rules of evidence, including those governing reliable 
hearsay, apply at a preliminary examination. Rule 7(h)(2), Utah 
R. Crim. P. (1997), provides that a finding of probable cause at 
a preliminary proceeding may be premised on hearsay evidence. 
Rule 7(h)(1), Utah R. Crim. P., provides that "a preliminary 
hearing shall be held under the rules and laws applicable to 
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criminal cases tried before a court." When read in conjunction, 
these rules, like the Utah Constitution, mandate that the 
evidentiary rules regarding the use of hearsay be applied in 
determining what is "reliable", admissible hearsay at a 
preliminary hearing. 
In addition to the Utah Constitution and the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the Rules of Evidence themselves assert their 
applicability to preliminary hearings. Rule 1101(b), Utah R. 
Evid., specifically sets forth the situations in which the rules 
of evidence do not apply.2 However, nothing in the language of 
1101(b) indicates that the rules of evidence do not apply to a 
preliminary hearing. In fact, the only reference to preliminary 
hearings concerns the fact that reliable hearsay is admissible. 
Rule 1101, Utah R. Evid., provides: 
(b) Rules Inapplicable. The rules [of 
evidence] do not apply in the following 
situations: (1) Preliminary questions of fact 
which are to be determined under Rule 104 (a) 
(see text below); (2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, 
sentencing or granting or revocation of 
probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, 
criminal summonses and search warrants and 
proceedings with respect to release on bail or 
otherwise; (4) Contempt proceedings in which 
the court may act summarily; (5) In a 
preliminary examination, nothing in these 
rules shall be construed to prevent the 
admission of reliable hearsay evidence. 
Rule 104(a), Utah R. Evid., provides: 
Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person 
to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court . . . In making this determination it 
is not bound by the rules of evidence. 
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See Rule 1101(b)(5), Utah R. Evid. If the drafters of the rules 
intended that the rules would not apply in a preliminary 
proceeding, then the language of 1101(b) would reflect this 
intention as plainly as it does with regard to other stages of a 
criminal proceeding. However, the rule is noticeably silent on 
this issue, indicating that it was the drafters' intent that the 
rules of evidence apply to preliminary examinations. 
Finally, case law reinforces the principle that the 
evidentiary rules apply at a preliminary proceeding. In State v. 
Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a ballistics report was admissible at a preliminary hearing 
since it satisfied the rules of evidence in that the expert who 
prepared the report was made available for cross-examination and 
the expert's opinions were based on personal observations of the 
bullets at issue. Id. at 268-69. The Schreuder Court expressly 
premised its decision on the plain language of the evidentiary 
rule governing expert testimony, noting that the "testimony was 
permissible under the . . . provisions of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and . . . did not in any way infringe upon defendant's 
constitutional right to be confronted by the witness against 
him." Id. (citing the then Rule 56(2), Utah R. Evid., governing 
opinion testimony). 
Other jurisdictions also apply the rules of evidence to 
preliminary examinations, especially when determining "reliable 
hearsay" for purposes of a preliminary hearing. In People v. 
Washington, 270 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. App. 1978), the Michigan Court 
20 
of Appeals held that an officer's testimony regarding a young 
child's identification of the defendant was not admissible at a 
preliminary examination since his testimony did not fall under 
the "tender years" or "res gestae" exceptions to the Michigan 
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 512-13. The Court expressly stated 
that " [a]t a preliminary examination, the recognized rules of 
evidence apply" since a finding of probable cause must be 
premised on "legally admissible evidence." Id. at 512 (emphasis 
original). 
The Idaho Supreme Court likewise held that an affidavit from 
a medical doctor concerning the results of a DNA blood test was 
not admissible at a preliminary hearing since it did not conform 
to the evidentiary hearsay rule governing use of such affidavits. 
See State v. Horslev, 792 P.2d 945, 951-54 (Idaho 1990). The 
Court so ruled in light of express statutory language permitting 
the use of affidavits at preliminary examinations, stating that 
"the report was not admissible, unless it was admissible under 
I.R.E. 803(24)." Id^ at 952. Accord State v. Jones, 660 P.2d 
965, 968-69 (Kan. 1983)(rules of evidence apply at preliminary 
hearing since testimony at preliminary hearing may be used 
against defendant at trial; only evidence admissible at trial may 
be considered by magistrate at preliminary hearing); State v. 
Massencrill, 657 P. 2d 139, 140 (rules of evidence apply at 
preliminary hearing without restriction). 
In light of the plain language of Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution, which provides that hearsay "as defined by 
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statute or rule", as well as the language of rules 7(h) (1), 
7(h)(2), and 1101(b), and case law directly stating that evidence 
rules governing the use of hearsay are determinative of reliable, 
admissible hearsay at preliminary hearings, the Utah Rules of 
Evidence are the index of reliability for purposes of preliminary 
hearings in this state. Accordingly, under the evidentiary 
rules, the toxicology report did not qualify as reliable hearsay 
and was improperly admitted by the magistrate presiding over the 
preliminary hearing. See Point B, infra. 
B. The Toxicology Report Is Unreliable Hearsay Not 
Included Within Any Hearsay Exception and Lacking 
in Foundation Which Might Otherwise Establish Its 
Reliability. 
The toxicology report is unreliable hearsay which may not be 
admitted at a preliminary hearing in support of probable cause3 
to bind Rodriguez over to the trial court since the report does 
not fall within any hearsay exception under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The rules of evidence expressly exclude the toxicology 
report as a police report under 803(8)(b). Likewise, the 
toxicology report is not included within the business records 
exception as provided under 803(6). See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (holding 
3
 In order to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the 
prosecution must present sufficient competent evidence to establish 
probable cause that the crime charged has been committed and that 
the defendant committed it. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) (2) (1997) . The 
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to 
establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must 
present a sufficient quantum of evidence to warrant submission of 
the case to the trier of fact. See State v. Pledger, 896 P. 2d 
1226, 1229 (Utah 1995)(citing State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 
(Utah 1980) . 
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evidence which fits within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" 
presumptively reliable); see also Rule 803(8)(B) and 803(6), Utah 
R. Evid. (1997). Finally, the toxicology report lacks foundation 
which might otherwise establish its reliability. See State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 1989). 
1. The Toxicology Report Is Inadmissible For 
Lack of Foundation. 
The trial court erred in admitting the toxicology report 
since the State failed to adequately establish its foundation at 
the preliminary hearing. Under Rimmasch, the "inherent 
reliability" of scientific testing procedures must be established 
before test results may be admitted as reliable hearsay under the 
rules of evidence. Id. at 398. 
In establishing the "inherent reliability" of the testing 
procedures, evidence must be presented establishing the 
qualifications of the crime lab employee conducting the test, as 
well as the proper functioning of the testing equipment. See 
Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Utah App. 
1990)(noting lack of evidence regarding training or certification 
of technician administering breathalyzer test); see also Kehl v. 
Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah App. 1987) (holding results 
of breathalyzer inadmissible where State presented no evidence as 
to functioning of test equipment or qualifications of 
administrator). 
At the preliminary hearing, the State did not present the 
lab technician who conducted the tests, nor any evidence 
concerning his or her qualifications. The State also failed to 
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present evidence regarding the methods used, and establish the 
proper functioning of the testing equipment. Notwithstanding the 
noted absence of such evidence, and over the objection of 
Rodriguez's counsel, R. 70, the judge erroneously concluded that 
the report was admissible, stating, "[although] we don't know . . 
. how [the substance] was analyzed, . . . it still seems to me 
that the constitution was amended to permit this kind of evidence 
at [a] preliminary hearing." R. 70-71. 
Contrary to the Court's conclusion, however, the 
admissibility of reliable hearsay at a preliminary proceeding 
does not dismiss the need to establish its foundation in the 
first place. Indeed, reports, such as the toxicology report at 
issue here, are reliable by virtue of the trustworthiness of the 
methods and qualifications of technicians producing the results 
indicated in those reports. A proper foundation regarding the 
testing procedures and the technician's qualifications is 
essential to a determination that test result are reliable. See 
Roosevelt City v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah App. 
1991)("[w]hile there is a presumption of reliability that permits 
admission of . . . test results . . . there is no presumption 
that the test results are, in fact, accurate")(emphasis 
original). Hence, in the absence of any evidence concerning the 
"inherent reliability" of the qualifications of the crime lab 
employee testing the contents of the baggie or establishing the 
accuracy of the procedures and equipment employed, the trial 
court erred in admitting the toxicology report where the state 
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failed to establish its foundation. 
2. The Toxicology Report Is Not A Business 
Record Within the Meaning of 803(6) . 
The toxicology report does not fall within the business 
record exception to the hearsay rule such that it would be 
presumptively reliable and thus admissible at the preliminary 
hearing. See Rule 803(6), Utah R. Evid. (1997); see also 
Roberts. 448 U.S. at 66(hearsay admissible if within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception). Rule 803(6) establishes records kept 
in the regular course of business activity as admissible hearsay. 
Rule 803(6), Utah R. Evid. (1997). However, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that a similar United States Customs' 
chemist report, indicating that a substance seized from the 
defendant was heroine, did not qualify as a business record under 
the identical federal rule 803(6). See United States v. Oates, 
560 F.2d 45, 75 (C.A.2 1977). That Court reasoned that admission 
of such "evaluative reports" would jeopardize a criminal 
defendant's confrontation rights. Id. at 78. 
Although the question presented in Oates has not been 
addressed directly in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court nonetheless 
provided clear guidelines for admitting police reports as 
business records under State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 
1983). The Bertul Court held a police report inadmissible since 
there was not a clear showing of foundation. Id. at 1184. Based 
on the language of Rule 803(6), Utah R. Evid., Bertul outlines 
the foundation requirements for a document generated by the 
police department to qualify as presumptively reliable under the 
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business record exception. 
The foundation should generally include the following: 
(1) the record must be made in the regular course of 
the business or entity which keeps the records; (2) the 
record must have been made at the time of, or in close 
proximity to, the occurrence of the act, condition or 
event recorded; (3) the evidence must support a 
conclusion that after recordation the document was kept 
under circumstances that would preserve its integrity; 
and (4) the sources of the information from which the 
entry was made and the circumstances of the preparation 
of the document were such as to indicate its 
trustworthiness. 
Id. 
The Bertul court held that police reports "made for the 
purpose of successfully prosecuting a crime" are inadmissible 
since the circumstances of their preparation "raise a serious 
question of reliability." Id.; see also Peronek, 803 P.2d at 
1297 (holding admission of jail incident report at probation 
revocation hearing violated defendant's confrontation rights). 
"[T]he reasons which might otherwise provide a basis to assume 
reliability of such reports as business records do not exist 
where police reports are offered by the prosecution in a criminal 
proceeding." Id. 
As a report prepared in anticipation of prosecuting the case 
against Rodriguez, the toxicology report at issue here is 
similarly excluded as a business record under Bertul. The 
extraordinary nature of this particular toxicology report is 
highlighted by the fact that neither of the officers knew, based 
on experience alone, that the white substance found on Rodriguez 
was cocaine, and therefore required the toxicology report in this 
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specific instance to initiate proceedings against Rodriguez.4 
Moreover, the crime lab's statutory mandate is to prepare such 
reports "for criminal prosecution" based on analyses of "evidence 
form crime scenes." Utah Code Ann. 53-5-104(5). Given the 
prosecutorial purpose of the toxicology report, the report fails 
the first Bertul requirement that the report be made as a routine 
matter. Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184. 
The toxicology report also fails to satisfy the third and 
fourth Bertul requirements in that the State did not establish 
that the baggie and its contents, the subject of the report, were 
"kept under circumstances that would preserve its integrity", and 
that "the sources of information from which the entry was made 
and the circumstances of the preparation of the [report] were 
such as to indicate its trustworthiness." Id. In order to admit 
a business record into evidence, a foundation must be laid by 
"the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness." 
Rule 803(6). "Where the evidence has passed through several 
hands, circumstances surrounding the chain of possession are 
relevant in making this assessment." State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 
1036, 1039 (Utah 1984) . 
In the case of the baggie seized from Rodriguez, there is 
dispute as to who was in possession of it from the time it was 
seized until the time it was entered into evidence at the jail. 
4
 At the preliminary hearing, the Court sustained Defendant's 
objection to the state's question of Officer Schow, which asked 
whether, based on his experience, he could identify the substance 
as cocaine. R. 62-63. 
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R. 53. Officer Farris, the officer who first saw the baggie and 
took it from Rodriguez's person, was out of town during the 
preliminary hearing and unable to testify as to the baggie's 
disposition. Id. Consequently, the Court relied upon the 
testimony of Officer Schow, who testified that he accompanied 
Farris to the jail where it was entered, but who admitted that he 
could not "say for sure" whether Farris kept the baggie with him 
at all times, or even whether he himself took the baggie at any 
point. R. 63. In Peronek, this Court noted that although 
another "qualified witness" may introduce a business record, an 
officer who was "twice-removed" from the preparation of the 
report in that case, and who had no other "custodial 
responsibility" to ensure the report's accuracy, was not 
qualified to "lay a foundation." Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298. 
Likewise in this case, the testimony of Schow as to an absent 
officer's handling of the evidence found on Rodriguez is 
insufficient to establish the chain of custody necessary to 
ensure the Court of its proper handling, and hence, its 
reliability. Consequently, the Court erroneously accepted 
Schow's testimony as sufficient evidence in support of the chain 
of custody. 
Even if Schow's testimony did adequately establish the chain 
of custody of the baggie up until it's booking into evidence at 
the jail, the State still failed to establish the chain of 
custody once the baggie was in the possession of the Crime Lab, 
as well as the accuracy of the methods and equipment used in 
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determining its contents. Beyond the bare fact that the baggie 
was delivered to the Crime Lab by the usual delivery person,the 
State did not present any evidence concerning its disposition 
after this point. (R. 68-69) Moreover, the State did not 
establish the "inherent reliability" of the testing procedure, 
namely the qualifications of the Crime Lab technician who 
ultimately tested the baggie's contents and the accuracy of the 
methods and the testing equipment employed. See Point B.l, 
supra; see also Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398. For example, the 
State did not put the criminologist on the stand who administered 
the tests of the substance, nor offer any testimony regarding the 
testing procedures. In the absence of such testimony, the 
toxicology report does not qualify as an admissible business 
record under Bertul. The lack of evidence concerning the chain 
of custody of the baggie while in possession of the Crime Lab, as 
well as the lack of evidence concerning the "inherent 
reliability" of the circumstances surrounding the testing of its 
contents do not establish the accuracy of the results such that 
the report would be admissible. 
In sum, the absence of Farris, the only officer with first-
hand knowledge of the disposition of the baggie, the uncertainty 
of Schow as to even its general disposition, and the complete 
absence of testimony as to its handling at the Crime Lab amount 
to a break in the chain of custody beyond a mere weak link going 
to the weight of evidence. See State v. Wvnia, 754 P.2d 667, 671 
(Utah App. 1988). Rather, this ambiguity leaves open a 
29 
substantial possibility that at some point the contents of the 
baggie were tampered with or altered. Id. ("circumstances 
surrounding the custody . . . and the likelihood of tampering are 
factors to be considered in determining [] admissibility.)5 
Given this probability, which goes directly to the reliability of 
the toxicology report, the court erred in admitting it as 
reliable hearsay in support of a finding of probable cause at the 
preliminary hearing. 
3. The Toxicology Report Is Expressly Excluded 
As A Police Report Under 803(8)(B). 
Even if the toxicology report qualified as admissible 
hearsay under the business record exception, the report would 
nonetheless be excluded as a police report pursuant to Rule 
803(8)(B) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule provides that 
public records prepared in the routine course of a public agency, 
pursuant to a duty imposed by law, are admissible "excluding, 
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers 
and other law enforcement personnel." Rule 803(8)(B), Utah R. 
Evid. (1997) (emphasis added) . 
This Court reviewed the applicability of 803(8)(B) to a jail 
incident report in Peronek, holding the report to be inadmissible 
5
 Although Wynia held that custody of marijuana evidence was 
established where it was placed in the "hands of the state," and 
was thus presumed to have been "handled with regularity, " that case 
is distinguishable from the instant case. Wynia, 754 P.2d at 671. 
In the present case, the State did not put the criminologist on the 
stand who tested the substance in the baggie, whereas in Wynia, 
that criminologist did testify and the only weak link in the 
custody chain was the absence of the crime lab employee who 
initially accepted the evidence from the officers. Id. 
30 
hearsay. Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298. The Court stated that the 
report was inadmissible hearsay under 803(8) (B) since it "did 
not materially differ from a crime report or other investigatory 
report expected to lead to some form of prosecutorial action." 
Id. (citing Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1184); see, e.g., United States 
v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (holding chemist report prepared by 
United States Customs as inadmissible hearsay expressly excluded 
by the police record exception under federal rule 803(8) (B) on 
basis that admission would violate defendant's confrontation 
rights). 
Likewise, the toxicology report at issue here was "not 
prepared in the regular course of jail administration." Id. 
Rather, this report was made solely in anticipation of building a 
criminal case against Rodriguez. See Point B.2, supra. The non-
routine nature of the toxicology report is underscored by the 
fact that the test was necessary to identify the substance in the 
baggie in order to establish probable cause to believe Rodriguez 
was guilty of possession as charged by the State; neither of the 
police officers present when the baggie and its contents were 
seized could positively identify the substance as cocaine based 
on their experience alone, and that the report was the only 
conclusive evidence to that effect. 
The fact that the report was prepared by an employee of the 
state crime lab does not shield it from the police report 
exclusion. Rule 803(8) (B) extends the exclusion to include 
reports generated by "other law enforcement personnel." The 
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crime lab is an instrumentality of the police department, 
instituted for the purpose of "analyz[ing] evidence from crime 
scenes and crime-related incidents for criminal prosecution." 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104(5) (1994). Consequently, the state 
crime lab employee who prepared the report is properly 
characterized as "law enforcement personnel" for purposes of this 
rule. See Oates, 560 F.2d at 67-68 (characterizing chemists of 
the United States Customs Service "law enforcement personnel" for 
purposes of Federal Rule 803(8)(B)). Thus, as a report prepared 
for the sole purpose of prosecuting the case against Rodriguez, 
generated by "law enforcement personnel" as proscribed under Rule 
803(8)(B), the toxicology report is expressly excluded as a 
police report under the Utah rules of evidence. 
C. The Admission of the Toxicology Report Violated 
Defendant's Rights of Confrontation and Cross-
Examination. 
Even if the rules of evidence are not determinative of 
"reliable hearsay" for purposes of a preliminary hearing, the 
admission of the toxicology report nonetheless violated 
I 
Rodriguez's constitutional right of confrontation and his 
statutory right to cross-examine the witnesses against him at the 
preliminary hearing. 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a criminal 
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation attaches at a 
preliminary hearing. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785 (citing Art. I, § 
12, Utah Constitution); see, e.g., Oates, 560 F.2d at 68-69 
(holding that admission of chemist's report, where chemist did 
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not testify, violated defendant's confrontation rights). The 
Anderson Court noted that a preliminary examination is an 
"adversarial proceeding in which certain procedural safeguards 
are . . . necessary to guarantee the accused's substantive right 
to a fair hearing." Id. With particular emphasis on the 
discovery which takes place at this stage of a criminal 
proceeding, the Court noted: 
the preliminary hearing represents an important step in 
the preparation of the defendant's defense for the 
subsequent trial. The opportunity to prepare an 
effective defense is recognized as essential to the 
preservation of the defendant's substantive right to a 
fair trial. Thus, . . . effectuation of the ancillary 
purposes of the preliminary hearing mandates the 
application of certain procedural safeguards to the 
hearing itself. 
Id. at 784. 
A criminal defendant also has the statutory right to "cross-
examine adverse witnesses" at a preliminary hearing. Rule 
7(h) (1), Utah R. Crim. P. (1997) . As explained by the Anderson 
Court, the "procedural right of cross-examination" is 
"encompassed in [the] right of confrontation" and serves to 
"prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used 
against the accused at trial in lieu of personal examination and 
cross-examination." Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785. "The application 
of the right of cross-examination, and the exclusion of certain 
out of court statements at this stage of the criminal prosecution 
insures essential protection of the defendant's substantive 
rights." Id. 
Based on the foregoing, the Anderson Court held that an 
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affidavit containing the sworn testimony of a material witness at 
a preliminary hearing was inadmissible hearsay since its 
admission would violate the defendant's right of confrontation. 
Id. at 786. "If the preliminary examination is to retain any 
meaningful significance in the criminal prosecution . . . , the 
protections attendant the defendant's right to present an 
affirmative defense cannot be circumvented by allowing the 
prosecution to base its showing of probable cause on [an extra 
judicum statement]." Id. 
The Anderson decision is still good law in light of the 
recent Article I, § 12 amendment ("amendment"), which permits 
reliable hearsay to be admitted at preliminary hearings. At 
most, the amendment curtails a criminal defendant's right to 
confrontation, but does not abolish the right altogether to the 
extent that defendants are heretofore subject accusation by 
unsworn ex parte statements. In the context of sentencing 
proceedings, the Utah Supreme Court stated that although evidence 
which would be inadmissible at trial is admissible at a 
sentencing hearing, "[t]his does not mean . . . that there is no 
requirement that the evidence presented . . . be reliable. . . . 
The due process clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions 'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably 
reliable and relevant information.'" State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 
1064, 1072 (Utah 1993)(quoting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 
(Utah 1985)); accord California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 
1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (fact that hearsay exceptions may 
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limit scope of protections under Confrontation Clause does not 
infer that "core values" must no longer be satisfied). 
Likewise, the same minimum level of reliability must remain 
in place in order to satisfy a defendant's confrontation rights 
at the preliminary hearing. As noted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Green, the remaining "core values" of the 
Confrontation Clause, namely that the declarant testifies and 
that defendant has opportunity for cross-examination, remain 
intact even where the rules of evidence provide for the admission 
of hearsay. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158 ("Confrontation Clause is 
not violated by [hearsay statements] as long as the declarant is 
testifying . . . and subject to full and effective cross-
examination") ; see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (Confrontation 
Clause requires that evidence presented at a preliminary hearing 
bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"). 
The practical consequence of the amendment on Rodriguez's 
confrontation rights, therefore, is that hearsay may be admitted 
against him at the preliminary hearing, but that hearsay must 
nonetheless satisfy the "core values" of the Confrontation 
Clause. Hence, the report cannot be offered against Rodriguez 
unless it was at least prepared under oath or the preparer 
testifies and is made available for cross-examination. See 
Green, 3 99 U.S. at 156-57 (although hearsay evidence may be 
admitted against a defendant in contravention of confrontation 
rights, hearsay must satisfy "core values" of the right in that 
the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination); see 
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also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1072 (due process under the Utah and 
United States constitutions "'requires that a sentencing judge 
act on reasonably reliable and relevant information'")(citation 
omitted). 
However, the toxicology report at issue in this case does 
not meet even the minimum guarantee of reliability to protect 
Rodriguez's Confrontation Clause rights. As in Anderson, the 
State did not present the person who prepared the testimony and, 
therefore, Rodriguez was denied the opportunity to confront that 
witness. In fact, the toxicology report is more unreliable than 
the sworn affidavit at issue in Anderson since this report was 
not sworn testimony. Moreover, the State did not provide any 
evidence as to the report's preparation. Specifically, the State 
did not offer testimony regarding the qualifications of the 
person who tested the substance, the conditions of the lab and 
testing equipment, or the chain of custody from the time it was 
entered into evidence at the jail to the time the report was 
made. See Point B.1-B.3, supra; see, e.g., Johnson, 856 P.2d at 
1072 (psychological report held inadmissible at sentencing 
hearing since it contained double and triple hearsay which was 
"so inherently unreliable and present Led] [] a high probability 
for inaccuracy"). Yet, despite the complete absence of any 
indicia of reliability, the magistrate accepted the report into 
evidence. 
The admission of the report denied Rodriguez's right to 
confront and cross-examine the witness against him at the 
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preliminary hearing. Since the person who prepared the report, 
an unsworn document alleging that the substance found on his 
person was cocaine, was not made available at the preliminary 
hearing, and since the report did not qualify as a hearsay 
exception under the rules of evidence nor bear other indicia of 
reliability, the trial court erroneously admitted the report in 
violation of Rodriguez's statutory and constitutional rights, 
thereby denying him a fair hearing and trial throughout the 
proceeding against him. See Anderson, 612 P.2d at 786. 
D. The Admission of the Toxicology Report Constitutes 
Reversible Error. 
1. Admission of the Toxicology Report Amounted to 
Constitutional Reversible Error. 
The admission of the toxicology report violated Rodriguez's 
constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses at a 
preliminary hearing, and therefore amounts to reversible 
constitutional error. Where "the error in question amounts to a 
violation of a defendant's right of confrontation . . ., its 
harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e., reversal 
is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987) (citing 
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 
L.Ed.2d 284 (1969)); see also State v. Villareal, 889 P.2d 419, 
425 (Utah 1995) . The factors to be considered regarding whether 
a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
include: 
the importance of the witness' testimony in the 
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was 
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cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the 
overall strength of the prosecution's case. 
Id. (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 
1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). 
Under this standard, the admission of the toxicology report 
amounted to reversible error. The report was essential to the 
State's allegation that Rodriguez was guilty of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). Without the report, the State could 
not otherwise establish probable cause that Rodriguez was guilty. 
The incriminating statements made by Rodriguez, identifying 
the substance as cocaine, did not bolster the State's case at the 
preliminary hearing since the statements were admitted in 
violation of the corpus delicti rule and should not have been 
considered, standing alone, as evidence that Rodriguez was 
guilty. The corpus delicti rule provides that "before a 
defendant's inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence 
against the defendant, the [prosecution] must prove the 
occurrence of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1992); see also Provo City 
Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah App. 1993). In the case 
at bar, the State offered Rodriguez's statements when the only 
other evidence before the judge was that a baggie containing a 
white substance was found on Rodriguez's person, which was not 
enough to establish probable cause. Consequently, Rodriguez's 
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statements were improperly offered in support of probable cause 
since the State had not yet established the corpus delicti by 
other competent and permissible evidence. 
Even if the State presented the balance of its remaining 
evidence prior to the introduction of Rodriguez's statement, the 
State's case still would fall short of establishing the corpus 
delicti of the crime. For example, The testimony offered by 
Officer Schow asserting that the substance was "consistent" with 
cocaine did not establish probable cause to bind the case over 
for trial. The State itself defined the scope and import of 
Schow's testimony as a mere statement of what the substance 
"might be", "could possibly be", rather than a "categorical []" 
statement of what it was. (R. 63) The fact that Schow's 
statement was speculative is highlighted by the fact that he 
admitted that at times he mistakenly identified baking soda for 
cocaine in other cases. (R. 64) In addition, the State failed 
to establish Schow's qualifications to make his assessment. (R. 
62) (trial court sustained Rodriguez's objection to Show's 
identification of the substance based on his experience for lack 
of foundation). Given the speculative nature of Schow's 
testimony, his statement alone did not establish probable cause 
at the preliminary hearing. 
Since Rodriguez's statement was not permissibly considered 
in the probable cause determination, and since Schow's 
speculative statement falls short of establishing probable cause, 
the toxicology report was the only evidence upon which a finding 
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of probable cause could have been found at the preliminary 
hearing. Given that the report was inadmissible as unreliable 
hearsay, the court did not commit simple harmless error in 
binding Rodriguez over on the charge of possession of a 
controlled substance based solely on the report's contents. 
Rather, the violation of Rodriguez's rights of confrontation 
constitute reversible constitutional error beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Rodriguez's conviction should be overturned accordingly. 
2. Admission of the Toxicology Report Was Prejudicial 
and the Outcome of the Preliminary Hearing Would 
Have Been Different If the Report Had Been 
Properly Excluded. 
Even if Rodriguez's confrontation rights were not violated, 
the admission of the unreliable report in contravention of the 
rules of evidence nonetheless constitutes reversible error since 
the outcome of the preliminary hearing would have been different 
if the toxicology report had been properly excluded. " [T]he 
standard for dealing with non-constitutional error is that [the 
court] will not reverse a conviction unless the error is 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a 
more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Strausberg, 
895 P.2d 831, 833 (Utah App. 1995). 
In the present case, the toxicology report was the only 
evidence establishing the State's charge that Rodriguez was 
guilty of possession. See, Point D.I., supra. The other 
evidence that the State presented at the preliminary hearing, 
namely the speculative testimony of Schow that the substance in 
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the baggie was "consistent with" cocaine, and Rodriguez's 
identifying statement, which was improperly admitted in violation 
of the corpus delicti rule, did not adequately establish the 
level of probable cause necessary to bind Rodriguez over to the 
trial court on the possession charge. Id. Consequently, had the 
toxicology report been properly excluded as mandated by the rules 
of evidence, then Rodriguez would not have been bound over on the 
possession charge for lack of probable cause. Since there is a 
reasonable likelihood, therefore, that "there would have been a 
more favorable result [if the report had been excluded]", the 
admission of the report amounted to reversible error. 
Strausbercr, 895 P. 2d at 833. Hence, Rodriguez's conviction on 
this charge should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Rodriguez respectfully requests this 
court to overturn his conviction based on the district court's 
erroneous dismissal of his motion to quash bindover and motion to 
suppress evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search of his 
person and vehicle. 
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